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COMMON SENSE, CONTRACTS, AND LAW
AND LITERATURE: WHY LAWYERS SHOULD
READ HENRY JAMES
Lenora Ledwon
"The stone of which this vall was composed was
'semantic stone.' The stones of which this wall was composed
were mere words... the thoughts [people] express or convey
are variables, depending on verbal context and surrounding
circumstances and purposes in view of the linguistic education
and experience of their users and their hearers or readers (not
excluding judges). This is true whether the words are in a
statute, a contract, a novel by Henry James, or a poem by Robert
Browning. A word has no meaning apart from these factors;
much less does it have an objective meaning, one true meaning."
Arthur L. Corbin, The Interpretation of Words and the
Parol Evidence Rule, 50 CORNELL L.Q. 161, 187 (1965).
"Who was it she was in love with?"
"The story will tell," I took upon myself to reply.
"Oh I can't wait for the story!"
"The story won't tell," said Douglas; "not in any literal
vulgar way."
"More's the pity then. That's the only way I ever
understand."
Henry James, THE TURN OF THE SCREW 5 (Bantam 1981)
(1898).
I'm against common sense. More accurately, I should say
I'm skeptical of it, suspicious that something that passes as plain,
ordinary wisdom all too often is a mask for racist, sexist, or
classist prejudices.
I am guilty of relying on the "it's just common sense"
argument myself. But ever since Deborah Post asked me to do a
1 J.D., University of Michigan Law School; Ph.D., University of Notre
Dame; Associate Professor of Law, St. Thomas University School of Law.
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Law and Literature "take" on common sense and the Gateway
2000 case, I have been rethinking my own use of the term. 2 Last
semester, I had one of those wonderfully uncomfortable moments
of synchronicity where teaching and scholarship collide. We had
just finished our first week of Contracts, during which we had
read an overview of several current theories of contractual
obligation and generally discussed the concepts of will, reliance,
efficiency, fairness and bargain. 3  (The theme for our course
introduction had been, "which promises should the law
enforce?") After class was over, a student who had listened very
attentively came up and said that she had wanted to ask a
question during class but had been afraid it was a "silly
"question.4
"I was just wondering," she asked, "does common sense
come into all this anywhere?"
At that moment, I "flashed" on a classic Disney cartoon.
Pluto, Mickey's faithful dog, is deciding whether or not to save a
pesky kitten who has fallen into a well. Up pops a tiny angel
2 Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1997) cert. denied 522
U.S. 808 (1997). I do not, of course, speak from any fixed, monolithic Law
and Literature viewpoint. Just as it is more accurate to speak of "feminisms"
with an "s" rather than the singular "Feminism," so, too, should we
understand that Law and Literature is an extraordinarily varied and diverse
movement. If one had any doubt about this, all he or she would have to do to
resolve the matter would be to sit down and read a few selections from James
Boyd White, Stanley Fish, Robin West and Judge Richard Posner. The only
"orthodoxy" common to Law & Literature is a pervasive interest in closely
scrutinizing texts (and sometimes an interest in closely scrutinizing
orthodoxies, as well).
3 This is per the excellent introductory chapters in Murphy, Speidel, and
Ayres's contracts casebook. See EDWARD J. MURPHY, RICHARD E. SPEIDEL,
IAN AYRES, STUDIES IN CONTRACT LAW chaps. 1 and 2 (5 TH ed. 1997). The
casebook excerpts a very useful article by Randy Barnett concerning current
theories of contractual obligation. See Randy Barnett, A Consent Theory of
Contract, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 269 (1986), excerpted in MURPHY SPIEDEL,
AYRES, CONTRACT LAW 43-55.
4 Whenever a student prefaces a remark with, "this is probably a silly
question," I brace myself, since, nine times out of ten, these are the most
probing and difficult questions of the semester.
5 This is from the Oscar winning cartoon, "Lend A Paw, " available on video
in WALT DISNEY'S THE SPIRIT OF MICKEY: HIS MOST TREASURED MOMENTS.
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next to Pluto's right ear, commanding, "Save the kitty!" Up
pops a tiny devil next to Pluto's left ear, snarling, "Ah, let it
drown!" What to do? I could reassure her with a comforting,
"yes, common sense always applies to contracts." Or I could
heap further torment on a person in a situation already fraught
with anxiety (first year law studies) by answering, "no, common
sense has nothing to do with contract law." Should I follow the
angelic path, or the demonic path? And which was which?
"Certainly, common sense comes into play in contracts,"
I responded, after a beat. I had chosen the demonic path. I
opted for simplicity, where complexity was due, for reassurance,
when I should have warned, as on ancient maps charting
unknown territories, "Here there be dragons." In short, I missed
out on a great teaching moment. This article is meant as a more
accurate (and redemptive) response, with suggestions from Law
and Literature for alternative ways of thinking and reading about
common sense. 6 A persistent underlying question will be, just
whose common sense is this?
6 Given the vast amount of Law and Literature scholarship, there are relatively
few Law and Literature studies that specifically deal with contracts (and none I
have seen that focus on contracts and common sense). Brook Thomas's
American Literary Realism and the Failed Promise of Contract (1997) is one
book-length study that uses nineteenth-century realist fiction to examine
American contract jurisprudence in the nineteenth century. (For an interesting
review essay on Thomas's work that also encompasses works by Owen Fiss
and Wai Chee Dimock, see Jonathan Boyarin, The Legacy of Lochner: Law
Literature, and the Resurrection of Contract, 24 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 195
(1999).) Law review articles on contracts and Law and Literature are not too
plentiful. A few of the more recent examples include the following: Barbara
A. Fure, Contracts As Literature: A Hermeneutic Approach to the Implied
Duty of Good Faith and Fair Dealing in Commercial Loan Agreements, 31
DUQ. L. REv. 729 (1993) (applying the hermeneutics of E.D. Hirsch to argue
that the only valid method of interpretation is one that considers all of the
circumstances surrounding the text); Amy Kastely, Symposium on Law,
Literature, and the Humanities: Out of the Whiteness: On Raced Codes and
White Race Consciousness in Some Tort, Criminal, and Contract Law, 63 U.
CN. L. REv. 269 (1994) (using literature and storytelling techniques to argue
that the objective theory of contract interpretation maintains hierarchies of
race, class and gender); Blake Morant, LMv, Literature, and Contract: An
Essay in Realism. 4 MiCH. J. RACE & LAW 1 (1998) (using literature to argue
for flexibility in contract doctrine, particularly in cases involving race and
2000 1067
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There are at least two ways that Law and Literature
methodologies can provide insight into the vexed space that is
common sense: (1) Common Sense as the Failure of Imagination,
and (2) Common Sense and the Problem of Ambiguity.
Generally, failure of imagination occurs in connection with
contract formation issues, and ambiguity with contract
interpretation issues. To help elaborate these issues in the
contractual universe of Gateway 2000 "pay now, terms later"
contracts, I will first draw on the etymology of the phrase
"common sense" to discuss the failure of imagination in the
contract formation issues in that case and second, I will utilize
Henry James' The Turn of the Screw to discuss ambiguity and
contract interpretation issues. 7
gender disparity); Daniel Yeager, Marlowe's Faustus: Contract as Metaphor?,
2 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 599 (1995) (arguing for the importance of
law in Faustus and disagrees with Judge Posner's interpretation of the Faustian
contract as merely metaphorical). Finally, as far as contracts casebooks, the
only one that has a true Law and Literature "sensibility" is AMY HILSMAN
KASTLEY, DEBORAH WAIRE POST AND SHARON KANG HONG, CONTRACTING
LAW (1996). In addition to a selection of cases that encompasses issues of
race, class and gender, the casebook includes selections from short stories and
poems and the editors include suggestions for incorporating film clips (from
films such as THE GRAPES OF WRATH) into class discussion.
7 HENRY JAMES, THE TURN OF THE SCREW AND OTHER SHORT FICTION
(Bantam 1981) (1898). I feel compelled to give at least a short explanation of
my choice of James here. Why a text by a privileged white male? Doesn't
this choice simply reinscribe prevailing hierarchies? First, if feminists can
find good use for Freud and Nietzsche, then there is no reason to give up on
James. Second, The Turn of the Screw is a text marginalized by genre. The
ghost story has long been considered a marginal genre, a particular kind of
mass market, popular culture that critics traditionally denigrate. Thus, the
form of such stories places them on the boundaries of critical regard.
Boundaries and thresholds are interesting places to examine cracks in the
larger structure. Third, James tended to write about outsiders, about people
on the borders of certain kinds of society (often about the boundaries between
American and European civilization). Finally, James was marginalized by
sexual preference. (There is a growing body of work on James' queer
sensibility. In fact, in a somewhat lurid link between law and literature, the
latest biography of Henry James, written by law professor Sheldon Novick,
suggests that the young Henry James may have had a brief affair with Oliver
Wendell Holmes shortly after the Civil War. SHELDON NOvICK, HENRY
JAMES: THE YOUNG MASTER 109-110 (1996).)
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COMMON SENSE AS THE FAILURE OF IMAGINATION
The Ethical Imperative to Imagine
The work that literature does is the work of the
imagination. This should not be divorced from the work we do
as lawyers. A number of Law and Literature scholars, beginning
perhaps with James Boyd White, have had the crucial insight that
law is a humanity as much as it is a science. 8 What kind of
world do we create in our practices? What kind of people do we
become? (And what kind of people do we want to become?)
Much depends on the labor of the imagination. By
"imagination," here I mean something approaching empathic
vision. This involves forming mental concepts of what is not
present by identifying with another. But isn't this as non-
deliberative a process as common sense? No. Imagination
differs from common sense because it is dynamic, it involves a
creative faculty, it exercises the power of forming new
conceptions.
The greatest ethical failure we consistently face, both
professionally and personally, is our own failure of imagination;
and one of the greatest temptations to betray the imagination
comes in the guise of common sense. Not only does our reliance
on common sense cut off any further rational analysis, it also
stops the imaginative process. Once something is labeled
"common sense," imagining stops. This becomes even more
clear when we consider some of the possible meanings of the
phrase, "common sense."
8 Three scholars I have found particularly helpful in the discussion of law as a
humanity and the ethical implications of that concept are James Boyd White,
Robin West and Martha Nussbaum. See generally MARTHA NUSSBAUM,
POETIC JUSTICE: THE LITERARY IMAGINATION AND PUBLIC LIFE (1995); ROBIN
WEST, CARING FOR JUSTICE (1997); JAMES BOYD WHITE, THE LEGAL
IMAGINATION (1973); JAMES BOYD WHrrE, HERACLES Bow: ESSAYS ON THE
RHETORIC AND POETICS OF THE LAW (1985).
2000 1069
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Definitions? Once More, "Whose Common Sense?"
Everyone wants to lay claim to common sense but no one
wants to define it.9 Like many former English majors, when I
am interested in exploring the etymology of a word, I turn to the
multi-volume set of the Oxford English Dictionary." ° The
O.E.D. gives four definitions for "common sense," each of
which is problematic from a Law and Literature perspective that
values imagination, the individual voice and the particularities of
lived experience. The first definition for "common sense" listed
9 There seems to be a popular consensus that the American legal system is
gravely lacking in common sense. "In the decades since World War II,"
writes Philip Howard, "we have constructed a system of regulatory law that
basically outlaws common sense." PHILIP K. HOWARD, THE DEATH OF
COMMON SENSE: How LAW IS SUFFOCATING AMERICA 11 (1994). Paul
Campos implicitly criticizes American law for its lack of common sense and
its tendency to produce Kafkaesque situations: "Until fairly recently the
central thesis of this book - that, in its more extreme manifestations, what
Americans call 'the rule of law' can come to resemble a form of mental illness
- would have seemed an exercise in frivolous or irresponsible hyperbole."
PAUL CAMPOS, JURISMANIA: THE MADNESS OF AMERICAN LAW ix (1998).
Norman Finkel, in his interesting study of how law conflicts with common
sense notions of justice, is one of the few to actually define "commonsense
justice": "[I]t reflects what ordinary people think is just and fair. It is
embedded in the intuitive notions jurors bring with them to the jury box when
judging both a defendant and the law. It is what ordinary people think the law
ought to be." NORMAN J. FINKEL, COMMONSENSE JUSTICE: JURORS'
NOTIONS OF THE LAW 2 (1995). Richard Redding, in a thoughtful analysis of
the implications of a "common-sense psychology" approach to psycholegal
research, examines some of the ways in which law codifies "common-sense
psychology," or "the lay knowledge of human behavior." Richard E.
Redding, How Common-Sense Psychology Can Inform Law and Psycholegal
Research, 5 U. CHI. L. SCHOOL ROUNDTABLE 107, 110 (1999). Finally,
proposed legislation frequently invokes "common sense" in the titles of Acts,
as evidenced by the "Common Sense Product Liability Legal Reform Act of
1996," H.R. 956, 104 ' Cong. (1996). This had its origins in the ninth tenet
of the Republican Party's Contract with America, the "Common Sense Legal
Reforms Act." See H.R. 10, 104' Cong., 1' Sess. (1995). All this, of
course, is only the tip of the iceberg.
'0 This is available in a condensed one-volume edition that comes with a
magnifying glass (for reading the near-microscopic print), and also on CD, but
I prefer using the multi-volume set.
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in the O.E.D. describes common sense as if it were a person, a
sort of master phenomenologist: "An 'internal' sense which was
regarded as the common bond or centre of the five senses, in
which the various impressions received were reduced to the unity
of a common consciousness."" In other words, common sense
sits inside your head like a miniature judge and sorts out all the
information you receive through sight, sound, touch, hearing,
and smell. Common sense is separate from the qualities of
imagination and remembrance, for the illustration (from Burton's
Anatomy of Melancholy) states that there are three different inner
senses: common sense, "phantasie," and memory. 12 Common
sense, it seems, is distinct from imagination and from memory.
All this was rather worrisome to me. Common sense doesn't
include our imaginative faculties? It doesn't include our past
stories?
The second definition was much more familiar to me and,
I suspect, is what most people think of when they hear the term.
"The endowment of natural intelligence possessed by rational
beings; ordinary, normal or average understanding; the plain
wisdom which is everyone's inheritance." 13 The illustration for
this definition includes the rather pithy statement that, "By a man
of common sense we mean one who knows, as we say, chalk
from cheese."' 4 But "normal" understanding begs the question.
Who decides the norm? (Whose chalk and whose cheese?)
The third definition is the communal or democratic
definition: "The general sense, feeling, or judgement of
mankind, or of a community."' 5 In other words, just take a
public opinion poll. Of course, a "majority rules" determination
of common sense will exclude minority views and re-marginalize
the disenfranchised.
The final definition of "common sense" is the "faculty of
primary truths .... ,,6 Common sense is "that power of the
1 III OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 573 (2 ed. 1989).12d.
13 id.
14 id.
15 idD16 I]I OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 573 (2r4 ed. 1989)..
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mind which perceives truth, or commands belief not by
progressive argumentation, but by an instantaneous, instinctive,
and irresistible impulse; derived neither from education nor from
habit, but from nature."' 7  Again, this definition worried me.
This is common sense as a non-deliberative process. What
counts as an "instinctive" reaction may very easily be the most
deep-seated, ingrained prejudices.
In summary, all these meanings of common sense should
trouble us. They should trouble us because they are not merely
quaint historical tidbits, but are powerful modes of rhetoric
present in real judicial opinions. The Gateway 2000 decision
exhibits elements of all four definitions of "common sense," and
in doing so reveals a deficiency in imagination.
Common Sense And Contracts: Gateway 2000
Hill v. Gateway 2000 is but the latest example of a "pay
now, get your contract terms later" case.18 Rich and Enza Hill
'7 id.
18 Prior to Gateway 2000, the two most notorious cases on the federal level
were ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996) (enforcing
shrinkwrap licenses) and Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585,
111 S. Ct. 1522, 113 L. Ed. 2d 622 (1991) (enforcing a forum-selection
clause included in the terms attached to a cruise ship ticket that the plaintiff
received only after payment. In Carnival Cruise Lines, however, the Court
scrutinized the forum selection clause for fairness and determined that the
requirement that all disputes be litigated in Florida was reasonable). There
have been a number of helpful articles on these type of cases. See, e.g.,
Darren C. Baker, Note: ProCD v. Zeidenberg: Commercial Reality, Flexibility
in Contract Formation, and Notions of Manifested Assent in the Arena of
Shrinkwrap Licenses, 92 Nw. U. L. REv. 379 (1997); Jean Braucher, Some
Basics of Software Contracting, Without Draft UCC Article 2B, SD30 ALI-
ABA 475 (1998); Lorin Brennan, The Consumer Interest in Disclosure of
Terms: A Strategic Analysis, 557 PLI/PAT 739 (1999); Stephen Y. Chow,
Contracting in Cyberspace: The Triumph of Forms?, 41 BOSTON B. J. 16
(May/June 1997); Mark A. French, Recent Development: Hill v. Gateway
2000, Inc., 12 OHIO S. J. ON DIsp. REsOL. 811 (1997); Kristin Johnson
Hazelwood, Note: Let the Buyer Beware: The Seventh Circuit's Approach to
Accept-or-Return Offers, 44 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1287 (1998); Christopher
L. Pitet, Note and Comment, The Problem With 'Money Now, Terms Later':
1072 [Vol 16
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ordered a computer over the phone and charged it to their credit
card. When the computer arrived, inside the box was a
document setting forth terms and conditions, including a
requirement that all disputes go to arbitration. The document
stated that unless the buyer returned the computer within 30 days,
the enclosed terms would govern the sale. The Hills experienced
a number of problems with the computer but kept it longer than
the 30 day period. Judge Easterbrook, writing for the Seventh
Circuit, held that the contract terms in the box were binding on
the Hills because they did not return the computer within 30
days. 19 Judge Easterbrook makes several appeals to common
sense (without specifically using the phrase) to justify enforcing
the terms in the box. In particular, he uses common sense in the
following passage to accomplish two objectives: (1) to refuse to
limit an earlier Seventh Circuit decision enforcing shrinkwrap
licenses to software transactions and (2) to suggest that the
Gateway 2000 case is good for consumers:
Plaintiffs ask us to limit ProCD to software, but
where's the sense in that? [emphasis added]
ProCD is about the law of contract, not the lav of
software. Payment preceding the revelation of full
terms is common for air transportation, insurance,
and many other endeavors. Practical
considerations support allowing vendors to enclose
the full legal terms with their products. Cashiers
cannot be expected to read legal documents to
customers before ringing up sales. If the staff at
the other end of the phone for direct-sales
operations such as Gateway's had to read the four-
page statement of terms before taking the buyer's
credit card number, the droning voice would
anesthetize rather than enlighten many potential
ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg and the Enforceability of 'Shrinkwrap' Softare
Licenses, 31 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 325 (1997); Jean Sternlight, Gateway
Widens Doonvay to Imposing Unfair Binding Arbitration on Consumers, 71
FLA. B.J. 8 (Nov. 1997).
19 Hill v. Gateway 2000, 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1997).
2000 1073
9
Ledwon: Read Henry James
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2000
1074 TOURO LAWREVIEW [Vol 16
buyers. Others would hang up in a rage over the
waste of their time. And oral recitation would not
avoid customers' assertions (whether true or
feigned) that the clerk did not read term X to
them, or that they did not remember or understand
it. Writing provides benefits for both sides of
commercial transactions. Customers as a group
are better off when vendors skip costly and
ineffectual steps such as telephonic recitation, and
use instead a simple approve-or-return device.2°
Easterbrook is a terrific writer and a good part of his
strength comes from a style that is invigorated by a "feel" for
common sense. Take a look'at his diction in the above passage:
"sense," "practical considerations," "benefits," "simple." This
is a passage infused with connotative meanings. The sound
reinforces the sense. The totality of this passage resonates with
the rhetoric of common sense or, perhaps more accurately,
resonates with something believed by certain readers to be
common sense. (That this particular concept of common sense is
not for everyone is clear from the furor the case has provoked.)
Easterbrook's decision has elements of all four definitions
of "common sense." It is similar to the first definition in that it
lacks a certain quality of imagination (but more on this later) .21
As for the second definition (normal, average understanding),
Easterbrook's passage evokes a kind of practical wisdom, the sort
of sensible statement we would expect from someone who knows
chalk from cheese. Per the third definition (the general sense of
the community), the passage draws on a bit of old fashioned
communal well-being: the decision is good for customers and
good for vendors, both sides benefit and everyone should be
20 /d. at 1149.
271 It is not that Easterbrook fails to be imaginative (he clearly imagines a
particular scenario) but that he is not being imaginative enough. He imagines
only one side of a scenario. Perhaps, as Tom Joo suggested to me,
Easterbrook fails to imagine that manufacturers, too, might one day be
purchasers. Particular imaginative qualities (such as full empathy) are absent
from his commonsensical use of imagination. Whether this is deliberate or not
is, of course, another matter.
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happy. Finally, in accord with the fourth definition ("primary
truths"), the argument seems compelling precisely because
common sense bypasses argument. It is non-deliberative,
instinctive, "natural." Easterbrook's passage commands truth
not so much through argumentation but through reliance on a
common sense that usurps the place of deliberation.22 This also
discourages counter-argument, for who, after all, can argue with
common sense?
For the disenfranchised, for consumers, for buyers with
less power than global corporations, such "common sense" can
be disabling rather than enabling. Whose common sense are we
talking about? This is the same problem that has surfaced
repeatedly with standards of reasonableness in cases involving
battered women, rape, racial and sexual discrimination - what is
the assumed "norm"? (If a reasonable man would not keep silent
but loudly complain about sexual harassment, why was Anita Hill
silent for so long? Why ask why?) As feminist, critical race,
and queer studies scholars (among others) have known all along,
this is an insidious problem, made all the more treacherous
because the terms "sound" so good. Who wants to be against
"reasonableness?" Who wants to be against "common sense?"
But we must remember that different buyers and sellers do not
universally share one particular "common sense."
Returning to our first (phenomenological) definition and
the point about imagination, Judge Easterbrook imagines a
certain kind of scenario to reach his conclusion: that a consumer
with common sense doesn't want the contract terms before he or
2, In a book review of Judge Posner's THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE,
Nancy Levit critiques Posner's "practical reason" as a form of common sense.
In particular, she criticizes common sense as "one of the intellectually weakest
methods of analysis," a method that is "concerned with cultural transmission
and replication," and as such is "conservative in orientation and method." [fn.
om.] Nancy Levit, Book Review: Practically Unreasonable: A Critique of
Practical Reason. A Review of The Problems of Jurisprudence, 85 Nw. U.L.
REv. 494, 502 (1991). By way of further illustration, a thoughtful article by
Maria Ontiveros points out the many problems with evidence law's reliance on
"common sense psychology." See Maria L. Ontiveros, Adoptive Admissions
and the Meaning of Silence: Continuing the Inquiry into Evidence Law and
Issues of Race, Class, Gender, and Ethnicity, 28 Sw. U. L. REv. 337 (1999).
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she pays. It makes for a good story, but it carries the baggage of
race, class and gender assumptions. Whose common sense is
this? What assumptions are made? Is Easterbrook's consumer
who responds with "rage" over the phone an upper class white
male, who has never lived from paycheck to paycheck and for
whom a computer is not an enormous investment? Who would
prefer to pay up front and consider it an advantage to have to
return goods that are unsatisfactory? Who is missing from the
scenario?
Consider the single working mother of color whose eight-
to-five job, plus 45 minute commute each way, leaves her little
time to shop for, let alone return, a computer. Her children have
been begging her for months for a computer. She reads
Gateway's advertisement during her 15 minute coffee breaks at
her secretarial job and while at work sneaks onto the Gateway
internet site to make sure the computer is a good deal. When she
finally purchases the computer, it is a large investment relative to
her modest income.
After delivery to her home, the computer never works as
promised. The 24 hour technical support hotline promised in the
ads constantly is busy. The speakers don't work right. Her
children are disappointed. She is frustrated.
But returning the computer is a real burden. The post
office is not yet open when she leaves for work in the morning
and is closed by the time she gets home at night. The only time
she can return it is on a Saturday morning, when she also has to
do a week's worth of shopping, laundry, and bills. She has to
find the packing tape and hope she hasn't thrown the box away.
It is expensive to ship a computer. She feels ike crying. She
also feels enraged.
Whose common sense is at work? Judge Easterbrook
assumes that returning the computer would be easy. (Perhaps it
would be, if you have a servant do it, or your wife.) But the
commonsensical assumptions embedded in his opinion evidence a
failure of imagination.
1076 [Vol 16
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COMMON SENSE, INTERPRETATION AND THE
PROBLEM OF AMBIGUITY
A second way in which Law and Literature studies can be
helpful in scrutinizing the limitations of common sense is in the
area of ambiguity.23 If our first topic (imagination) fits well in
the contract formation area, ambiguity is central to contract
interpretation.
Common sense moves to fill the void created by
ambiguity. Common sense tells us that there cannot be
unresolved ambiguity. Common sense is uncomfortable with the
wholly ambiguous and desires a binary script, an "either/or"
ordering, rather than something oscillating between. Law will
provide a way to name experience. There must be a way to
articulate a preferred meaning.
23 Although I am focusing on how literature can help us understand ambiguity,
other arts (such as painting and music) can be helpful as well. In his analysis
of ambiguity in The Turn of the Screw, Shlomith Rimmon discusses the
drawings of Escher as well as the shifting images of such well-known
drawings as a duck that turns into a rabbit or an urn that becomes two profiles.
SHLoMrrH RIMMON, THE CONCEPT OF AMBIGUITY: THE EXAMPLE OF JAMES
(1977). In opera, the recent revival of interest in more authentically Baroque
countertenor singing creates a (sometimes uneasy) sense of ambiguity in the
listening audience. A countertenor sings in a high, falsetto, head voice so that
he sounds very much like a woman singing mezzo soprano. Handel and
others wrote roles for castrati; today, those roles can be sung by women or by
countertenors. See generally Albert Innaurato, Music: Haily-chested
sopranos. Guys who sing like girls are all the rage in the opera world these
days. What's that about?, FORBES, Aug. 9, 1999, at 154; Ken Ringle,
Opera's Prime Cut: 'Caesar' Sans Castrati; Handel Masterpiece Requires
Creative Casting, WASHINGTON POST, Feb. 6, 2000, at G01; P.Y.VAN, So
What's a Countertenor Anyway?, Bus. TmEs (SING.), Jan. 22, 2000, at EL2.
I recently heard the Florida Grand Opera production of Handel's Julius
Caesar, which included two countertenors in major roles (David Daniels as
Caesar and David Walker as Tolomeo). Hearing what sounded like a
gloriously rich female voice emerge from the energetic, bearded, boyishly
masculine Caesar, I kept finding myself doing the mental equivalent of
flipping back and forth between the duck/rabbit drawing. By the end of the
production, I was exhausted (not so much because the production was three
and a half hours, but from all the extra imaginative exertion) and completely
hooked.
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There has been a great deal of innovative work done in
Law and Literature studies on the topic of interpretation.24
Relatively little has been done specifically in the area of contract
interpretation and Law and Literature. However, one of the
many interesting moments in the long-standing critical exchange
between Stanley Fish and Judge Richard Posner involves the
ambiguity of a hypothetical contract. Posner states:
If a document states that it is the complete
integration of the parties' contract, and the price
stated in the document is $100 per pound, the parol
evidence rule will prevent the seller from later
offering testimony that in the negotiations leading
up to the contract the parties had agreed that the
price would be $100 per pound only for the first ten
pounds after which it would be $120 per pound.
The document is not ambiguous.25
Fish comments as follows:
But Posner misses the point. The document is
neither ambiguous nor unambiguous in and of
itself. The document isn't anything in and of
itself, but acquires a shape and a significance only
within the assumed background circumstances of
its possible use, and it is those circumstances --
which cannot be in the document, but are the light
in which 'it' appears and becomes what 'it,' for a
time at least, is -- that determine whether or not it
is ambiguous and determines too the kind of
24 This is such a rich area that a comprehensive footnote would be longer than
this article. However, among the influential scholars in this area are Ronald
Dworkin, Stanley Fish, Owen Fiss, Sanford Levinson and Richard Weisberg.25 Richard Posner, Law and Literature: A Relation Reargued, 72 VA. L. REV
1351,1371 (1986).
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straightforwardness it is (again for a time) taken to
possess.2 6
What is particularly interesting in this exchange is what it
suggests about juridical habits of reading in the face of potential
ambiguity. Fish goes on to state:
As things stand now in our culture, a person
embedded in the legal world reads in a way
designed to resolve interpretive crises (although as
Walter Michaels reminds me, after he was
reminded of it by a practicing lawyer, at some
stages in the preparation and even the arguing of
cases, the proliferating of interpretive crises is just
the skill called for), while someone embedded in
the literary world reads in a way designed to
multiply interpretive crises.27
Thus, habits of reading can influence our interpretive processes.
Is there a problem of ambiguity in Gateway 2000? If so,
is common sense rushing to fill the void? And can Henry James
help out? Initially, the Gateway situation seems purely a
formation problem. When was the contract formed? Did the
contract bell ring when the Hills paid for the computer, or not
until the Hills kept the computer for 30 days and had an
opportunity to peruse the standard terms and conditions included
in the box? 28 This is a formation issue. As first year students
soon learn, 2-207 is seldom about the existence of a contract. It
is about content, and whose terms apply. In fact, there may be
an interpretation issue in Gateway. Certainly, there seems to
have been some difference of opinion as to what exactly the Hills
were purchasing or what it was that Gateway had advertised.
26 Stanley Fish, Don't Know Much About the Middle Ages: Posner on Law and
Literature, 97 YALE L.J. 777, 784 (1988).27Id. at 787 [fa. om.].
2 The helpful concept of the contract bell ringing is from the editors'
introductory notes to chapter three in the computerized disk Teacher's Manual
to MURPHY, SPIEDEL, AYREs, supra note 3.
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The difference between the system the Hills received and the
system they expected to receive might be explained as a mistake
(whether unilateral or mutual), as a case of misleading or false
advertising, as a breach of warranty, or, possibly, as a problem
in interpretation. The interpretation issue is intertwined with the
formation issue, but not in an obvious way. Generally speaking,
the formation issue takes precedence because we first want to
address the issue of whether or not a contract exists before we
argue over the contents of the agreement.2 9 But in a "pay now,
terms later" agreement, the formation issue subsumes an equally
significant interpretation issue. There is an elision in the judicial
opinion, a gap that is filled by common sense. It is common
sense that we must address the formation issue first. But what
happens if we consider interpretation first, or at least
simultaneously? What happens if we try (pun intended) to "think
outside the box?"
This is no more strange than deciding that the Hills have
"agreed" to a contract without knowing its terms. If we can
imagine an agreement that is floating in time (goods and money
are exchanged, but the agreement is on "hold"), then perhaps we
should consider terms that are floating in space (the words in the
Gateway ads, what the Gateway representative told the Hills,
consumer expectations, or industry standards). 30  By answering
29 Apparently, neither the plaintiffs in the Gateway 2000 case nor the plaintiffs
in Carnival Cruise Lines raised interpretation issues. In Carnival Cruise
Lines, the plaintiffs attempted to argue that the terms on the back of the cruise
ticket were hard to read because they were buried amongst a great deal of fine
print. In Gateway 2000, the plaintiffs didn't argue that the terms were hard to
understand, but argued that the Hills did not bother to read them, implying
that consumers were unlikely to read a lengthy set of terms and conditions
included with a computer. These arguments raise the specter of procedural
and substantive unconscionability.
30 As far as industry standards go, another pertinent question is, precisely
which industry are we talking about? Companies that routinely use the "pay
now, terms later" include insurance companies, the travel industry, and mail
order and phone order companies. What counts as standard practice in a
brave new world? We are on the brink of (if not already immersed in) an
explosion in e-commerce. So it's a bit disingenuous to say the industry
standard is "X" when the norms of industry are changing as we speak.
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the formation question first, and in a particular way, we foreclose
interpretation. But that, of course, is common sense.
WAYS OF READING AND RE-READING
My experience teaching both law students and
undergraduates has been that, generally speaking, law students
are much more unhappy with ambiguity than their undergraduate
counterparts. This may be related to different mindsets or
different approaches to what students see as their missions (and
perhaps to what different professors see as their own pedagogical
missions, as well). Law students like to perceive themselves as
problem-solvers, focusing on practical applications of rules to
clients' fact-patterns. The students need for there to be a solution
(and this is not an insignificant need). In the first year of
Contracts, in particular, a sense of desperation fills the classroom
when it becomes apparent that ambiguity is going to be an
issue. 31  Undergraduates, no matter how grade-driven, seem
willing to engage in and even enjoy moments of free play among
signifiers. What happens between undergraduate education and
law school education? Does the process of thinking like a lawyer
mean we must abandon old habits of reading? Several scholars
have suggested that law school trains us to read "only for useful
bits," a style of reading that is "reductionist" and merely a
matter of paraphrase.32 There is certainly nothing wrong with
knowing how to read for the useful bits. But we need not
abandon other ways of reading. 33  The point of law school
31 This desperation, I hasten to add, is not solely on the part of the students.
32 (And perhaps the above sentence is a prime example.) See Philip C.
Kissam, Disruptions of Literature: Disturbing Images: Literature in a
Jurisprudence Course, 22 LEGAL STUD. FORUM 329, 330 (1998). For the
point about "paraphrasing," Kissam refers to Elizabeth Fajans and Mary
Falk's excellent article, Against the Tyranny of the Paraphrase: Talking Back
to Texts, 78 CORNELL L. REv. 163, 163-70 (1993). Kissam also suggests that
lawyers read "from the top down," starting by forcing a particular analytical
framework on the text. Kissam at 330, (citing JEROME BRUNER, ACTUAL
MINDS, POSSIBLE WORLDS 9-43 (1986)).
31 remember one Law and Literature class taught by James Boyd White at the
University of Michigan Law School in which we discussed Mark Twain's Life
2000 1081
17
Ledwon: Read Henry James
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2000
TOURO LAWREVIEW
education, I continue to hope, is not to jettison everything you
have learned up to now, but to build on what you carry with you.
Law students, lawyers, law professors, and judges need to
be reminded of their familiarity with and acceptance of very
uncomfortable ambiguities. Such familiarity makes it easier to
accept the accompanying process of re-reading and re-cognition
(in the sense of a new, perhaps contradictory understanding) that
opens up a text. But isn't this a bad thing? Don't we want to
close down texts, close down meaning? Isn't it common sense
that our job as lawyers is to put an end to interpretation, to make
a case that there is only one correct story and it is our client's
story?
Not necessarily. There are the instances (to which Fish
alludes) when we may be interested in opening up a text.
Perhaps we need to argue that a term is ambiguous and hence
unenforceable, for example, or more generally and perhaps more
subtly, we -- lawyers, judges, law students, professors -- may
need to acquire a certain comfort level, a sensitivity, a particular
"feel" for ambiguity.
So what can Henry James offer as far as common sense
and contract interpretation are concerned? Let's take the case of
James's novella, The Turn of the Screw. A young, inexperienced
governess accepts a position in an isolated country house. Her
two young orphan charges, Miles and Flora, are lovely and
angelic children. The governess has complete responsibility over
them. (The children's dilettante uncle has hired the governess on
the condition that she never contact him with any problems.)
Things soon take on a sinister hue. The governess receives a
letter from Miles's headmaster forbidding Miles's return to
school, but not specifying what Miles has done wrong. She
learns that the previous governess (also young and beautiful) has
died, but no one quite knows the details of the death. The
governess sees a strange, malevolent-looking figure who appears
to be Peter Quint, the dead servant of the uncle. The governess
also sees the ghost of Miss Jessel, the prior governess. No other
on the Mississippi. In one passage, Twain ruminated over the different ways
he had looked at and appreciated the Mississippi River over time (the different
ways he "read" the river).
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adults can see the ghosts. (Whether the children can see them is
not certain.) Soon, the governess becomes convinced that Quint
and Jessel, who had been lovers and who had a strange and
possibly corrupting influence over the children in life, are trying
to extend that influence over Miles and Flora from the grave.
The governess desperately wants to save Miles and Flora. She
wages a battle of wills with the ghosts. Finally, she saves the
souls of the children, but at the cost of Flora's health and Miles's
life.
Is this a ghost story or is the governess hallucinating?
34
Does she save the children or destroy them? The Turn of the
Screw has been called a "chameleon text," capable of taking on a
great variety of critical interpretations. 35 But it is precisely the
story's quality of ambiguity that has most interested recent critics
and that is most pertinent for our purposes.
"I remember the whole beginning as a succession of
flights and drops, a little see-saw of the right throbs and the
34 The most influential early work suggesting that the ghosts are not real but
are hallucinations is Edmund Wilson's 1934 Freudian essay, "The Ambiguity
of Henry James." See Edmund Wilson, The Ambiguity of Henry James, in A
CASEBOOK ON HENRY JAMEs'S THE TURN OF THE SCREW, 2d ed. 115
(Gerald Willen ed., 1969). There are a great many critical works discussing
the issue of ambiguity in James's story. In fact, it is difficult to find an
analysis of the story from the last 50 years that does not address the issue of
ambiguity. Rimmon's study from the late 70's is still a very pertinent work.
SHLOMLTH RIMMON, THE CONCEPT OF AMBIGUITY - THE EXAMPLE OF
JAMEs (1977). The most useful and recent overview of the voluminous body
of criticism on The Turn of the Screw is Peter Beidler's text. PETER G.
BEIDLER, CASE STUDIES IN CONTEMPORARY CRITICIsM: HENRY JAMES, THE
TURN OF THE SCREW (Peter Beidler, ed., 1995).
35 'Depending on who is reading it, the story can be a gothic tale in the
tradition of Poe, a romantic tale in the tradition of Hawthorne, or a realistic
tale in the tradition of Howells. It can be a Freudian tale of sexual repression,
an allegory of good and evil, a detective story about murder and deception, a
call for better treatment of children, or a reflection of hidden truths about its
author. It can demonstrate its author's knowledge of scientific research on
ghosts, his rejection of that knowledge, his accord with the social structures of
his time or his rejection of those structures. It can be read as a Marxist
statement, a feminist statement, or a homosexual statement." PETER G.
BEIDLER, About This Volume, in CASE STUDIES IN CONTEMPORARY
CRITICIsM: HENRY JAMS, THE TURN OF THE SCREW viii (Peter G. Beidler
ed., 1995).
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wrong. " 36 So begins the governess's record of the story. This
beginning also foreshadows the reader's experience with the text.
This pattern of up and down, right and wrong sensations,
recapitulates our experience of ambiguity (and the thinly-veiled
desire that is at one and the same time psychosexual and also a
desire for mastery over the story).
Terry Heller is quite correct in stating that the first
reading of The Turn of the Screw is, for most readers, as a ghost
story, with subsequent rereadings becoming more uncertain.
37
The ghost story reading, ironically, is the initial common sense
reading because we have certain set expectations of the genre.
Both the setting of the story and James's Preface suggest that
what is to follow will be a ghost story. The frame narrative (by
an unidentified narrator) begins in the nineteenth-century
tradition of telling ghost stories on Christmas Eve:
The story had held us, round the fire, sufficiently
breathless, but except the obvious remark that it
was gruesome, as on Christmas Eve in an old
house a strange tale should essentially be, I
remember no comment uttered till somebody
happened to note it as the only case he had met in
which such a visitation had fallen on a child."
James's Preface begins by locating the seed of his idea for
the novella in a half-remembered ghost story related by a
friend. 3 9  Authorial intent here, as is the case of statutes or
constitutions, is not as helpful as we might hope. In the Preface
to the 1908 edition, James comments on the story:
36JAMES, supra note 7 at 9.37 Terry Heller, The Turn Of The Screw: Bewildered Vision 31 (1989).38JAMES, supra note 7, at 3.39 HENRY JAMES, PREFACE To 1908 EDITION OF THE TURN OF THE SCREW, in
BEIDLER, supra note 34, at 117-18. James, in fact, wrote The Turn of the
Screw under a contract to write a ghost story for the magazine, Collier's
Weekly. Peter G. Beidler, Introduction: Biographical and Historical
Contexts, in CASE STUDIES IN CONTEMPORARY CRITICIsM: HENRY JAMES,
THE TURN OF THE ScREw 3, 13 (Peter Beidler, ed. 1995).
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It is an excursion into chaos while remaining, like
Blue-Beard and Cinderella, but an anecdote -
though an anecdote amplified and highly
emphasized and returning upon itself; as, for that
matter, Cinderella and Blue-Beard return. I need
scarcely add after this that it is a piece of ingenuity
pure and simple, of cold artistic calculation, an
amusette to catch those not easily caught (the
"fun" of the capture of the merely witless being
ever but small), the jaded, the disillusioned, the
fastidious.a°
All this suggests that lawyers might just be the perfect audience
for James. 4 '
But if the first common sense reading of the story as
purely a ghost story is the only reading, we are missing out. A
reader who is not just reading for "useful bits," who has not long
ago reached the common sense conclusion that this must be just a
ghost story, might come to the last passage in the story and be
troubled. In the final tense scene, the governess is engaged in a
battle of wills with the ghost of Peter Quint for the soul of young
Miles. Triumphantly, the governess calls to Miles, "I have
you," but what follows is very strange:
[I]e uttered the cry of a creature hurled over an
abyss, and the grasp with which I recovered him
might have been that of catching him in his fall. I
caught him, yes, I held him - it may be imagined
with what a passion; but at the end of a minute I
began to feel what it truly was that I held. We
40 Henry James, Preface To 1908 Edition Of The Turn Of The Screw, in
BEIDLER, supra note 34, at 120.
41 Lawyers tend to be a bit jaded and disillusioned and to pride themselves on
such qualities. In my first year as an associate at a corporate law firm, a well-
meaning partner took me aside and suggested, "Look, you've just got to learn
to be more cynical."
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were alone with the quiet day, and his little heart,
dispossessed, had stopped.42
This is a disturbing ending. How does the governess
know she has won? What is it, exactly, she has won?
Other earlier sections now begin to take on an ominous
light with re-reading. For example, at one point the governess
interrogates Miles concerning his bad behavior at school. She
pauses for a moment:
I seemed to float not into clearness, but into a
darker obscure, and within a minute there had
come to me out of my very pity the appalling
alarm of his being perhaps innocent. It was for
the instant confounding and bottomless, for if he
were innocent what then on earth was 1?43
In fact, the more we puzzle over the story and go back to
re-read portions, the more ambiguous it becomes. The governess
herself articulates this dilemma, discussing her experience with
the children: "No, no - there are depths, depths! The more I go
over it, the more I see in it, and the more I see in it the more I
fear. I don't know what I don't see - what I don't fear! , 44
In his great study of the fantastic in literature, Tzvetan
Todorov describes The Turn of the Screw as an example of the
pure fantastic, that is, a work that is wholly ambiguous: "[the
text] does not permit us to determine finally whether ghosts haunt
the old estate, or whether we are confronted by the hallucinations
of a hysterical governess victimized by the disturbing atmosphere
which surrounds her." 45
42 JAMES, supra note 7, at 101.43 JAMES, supra note 7, at 101.
44JAMES, supra note 7, at 37.
45 TZVETAN TODOROV, 43 THE FANTASTIC (Richard Howard tr., 1977).
Todorov defines the "fantastic" as the border between the uncanny and the
marvelous. Id. at 43-44.
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So what connections can we make between ambiguity in
the Gateway case and ambiguity in James' novella? One
irresistible connection is that both are, in a sense,
phantasmagorical stories which begin in the ordinary, the
everyday, and end by creating a profound sense of uneasiness in
many readers. (How appropriate that the corporation's name is
"Gateway," evoking as it does the mysterious question of portals
and thresholds. Gateway to what?) But of course this is too
fanciful. And unlike James' story, a lead case rarely will present
a problem of complete ambiguity. (Perhaps one of the closest
examples is the classic case of Raffles v. Wichelhaus, with its two
ships named "Peerless" each sailing from Bombay with a load of
cotton and no way for the court to decide what was meant by a
contract to purchase cotton from the Peerless from Bombay.) 46
Rather, the ambiguity in Gateway stems from the issue of
intent. What precisely did Gateway and the Hills intend? What
common sense assumptions paper over potentially ambiguous
words or acts? The Hills did not return the computer within 30
days. How are we to read this conduct? What was their intent?
Easterbrook determines the Hills had an opportunity to read
everything in the box and to return the computer, and cites the
general rule that a party has a duty to read the contract or else
accept the risk.47 But contemporary commercial transactions
over the telephone or the internet can be fraught with ambiguity.
Failure to return the computer within 30 days might be assent,
but then again, it might not. Such a failure could be typical
consumer passivity, an acknowledgment of one's own
powerlessness as a consumer (an acknowledgment that seems
legitimated by this case), general exhaustion with our overloaded,
multi-tasking, 21' century lives, or perhaps even an honest belief
that terms will not be imposed unilaterally and after payment. 48
The experience of ambiguity is something lawyers rather
desperately shun, when we should instead appreciate, if not
46Raffles v. Wichelhaus, 2 H.&.C. 906, 159 Eng. Rep. 375 (1864).47Hill, 105 F.3d at 1148.
48 1 am grateful to Deborah Waire Post for her suggestions concerning the
possible intent issues in Gateway.
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embrace it. Starting as first year law students, our legal
education can be very much like reading The Turn of the Screw
and being faced with ambiguity at every turn. (I have a
colleague who takes great pride in never answering a question in
class but always responding with another question.) In the face
of ambiguity, students will fall back on common sense
explanations as to why one interpretation is preferable.
Practitioners most typically will be interested in closing down
texts, in hammering out unitary, common sense explanations.
Judges, too, will prefer common sense interpretations to
uncomfortable ambiguities (although a judge, as "master reader,"
is a reader who should know that the story does not end with this
one particular case).
Recognizing, reading, and re-reading for ambiguity are
skills that fall by the wayside when common sense enters the
discussion. Reading for ambiguity not only enables us to be
more sophisticated readers, it also allows us a measure of
comfort. One of the hardest things is living with indeterminacy,
in our practices, in our lives. The ability to recognize and
understand ambiguity is an enabling quality and just one of the
many reasons lawyers should read Henry James.
Finally, perhaps, the issues of imagination and ambiguity
come together. Faced with an ambiguous situation, a failure of
imagination can limit our ability to understand while a successful
appeal to imagination can allow us to derive a richer, more
complete meaning from the story. Such a meaning should not be
limited by overly simplistic, narrow appeals to common sense.
Rather, one potential goal for us as legal readers is not to cease
reading, but to find a provisional resting point, a good spot for
repose. The opening quotes to this article, from Corbin and
James, remind us of the difficulties of interpretation, and
implicitly critique any too easy interpretation based on a
transcendent appeal to common sense.
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